Working Conditions in Bradford 19th Century

Worksheet: Living and working conditions in 19th century Bradford. This short piece of writing will be describing and explaining why and how the living and working conditions were so appalling in 19th century Bradford. A quote from the poet George Weerth in 1842 gives a graphic idea of what life was like in Bradford 19th century. He gives quite a detailed verse saying in one part that ‘you think you have been lodged with the devil incarnate’ (Bradford health-General, no date) this gives the impression that he would rather be residing or is the same as hell because of the immense disease and vile stench.He compares Bradford to Leeds, Birmingham and Manchester. The reason for these horrendous conditions was the adaptation of industrialisation and urbanisation. Industrialisation was when people moved to the cities, and machines produced things instead of by hand. When industry started to adapt, Bradford started to become worse, in 1800 Bradford had 1 spinning mill 50 years later it had 129 mills. This huge growth in industry and population had some catastrophic effects on Bradford.In 1769 the waterframe was invented, it was powered by water but, it was not a very good machine as with water there are floods, droughts, and foul smells from rivers. One of the main problems came when the use of steam came into force, as coal mills sprang up extremely fast, this transformed human relationships (capitalism). Many of the factories were dominated by women and children, as women were easily controlled and received less than a quarter of the wages that males received. In 1830 in John Woods spinning mill (which was the biggest spinning mill in Bradford) had 528 workers, 489 were women and 38 men.As the industry expanded, even more the openings of wool houses and dye houses came, later then came more shops and houses, they were built anywhere and everywhere. These houses were one up and one down, had no kitchen, no water and no toilet. People bought water private ly in barrels; little did they know that this water could have come from anywhere. At this point there was no sewerage and the dye from the dye houses flooded the town and rivers. It is said that people could set fire to Bradford canal and the water from Bradford could turn silver watch cases black.While the women and children dominated the industry, illness and sickness rates shot through the roof, while there was no sewerage and the population was uncontrollable the average age of death was 18 years old, over fifty percent of children never reached the age of five, and the majority never reached the age of one. In one district alone over five hundred people shared one toilet. In 1850 Bradford won prizes for being the biggest area for textiles, taking over places such as, Manchester and Leeds.At this point in time Bradford was at its worst ,in 1850 the graveyard was full of bodies, houses were too crowded and people kept pigs, chickens and human excrement outside their doors until farmers came and took it away (at the right cost). In the 1841-1851 census it was recorded that up to 20 people were living in one house. Unaware of the dangers of no sewerage, people thought there was no harm in this way of living, as everyone believed these diseases were miasmic diseases and the diseases were caught by overcrowded areas.They believed that decomposing animal and vegetable substances (Thompson, 1982, pp137-138) caused diseases such as smallpox, typhus, cholera and other horrific, frightful diseases. The Bradford Registration District said about twenty percent of all mortality was attributable to ‘Miasmic Diseases’ (Thompson, 1982, pp137-138) so a cleanup of the environment was needed to improve life expectancy. As a conclusion to this piece of writing, it is proven that although the mass growth in industry made Bradford into the biggest textile production area, it also caused colossal social tragedy in Bradford.The main reason for the adaptation in Brad ford was for immediate profit but unfortunately in caused disastrous effects on society.Bibliography Thompson, B (1982) â€Å"Public Provision and Private Neglect: Public Health† in â€Å"Wright, DG jowitt, JA (eds. ) Victorian Bradford. Bradford: City of Bradford Metropolitan Council, pp 137-138. Bradford Health- general (no date). Available at: http://wwwschoolhistory. org. ukgcse/medicine/publichealth/bradford (Accessed: 24 September 2009)

The Nature of Contagious Yawning

Report title: Contagious yawning Introduction Yawning in general Yawning is a common act in all humans from birth and is one of the best examples of a fixed action pattern; once a yawn begins it becomes unstoppable. It also occurs in the same way each time. Several theories have been proposed to explain its existence in everyday life. There has been no definitive way of explaining why yawning occurs. Communication, physiology and arousal will be discussed. Firstly, communication is proposed as a primary reason for yawning, by Guggisberg, Mathis, Herrmann & Hess (2007). They attribute yawning to vigilance and suggest that unconscious communication occurs to synchronise a group and show vigilance. Baenninger (1987) also suggest that yawning helps to maintain attention levels and it may have evolved to promote vigilance and further suggest that it could communicate drowsiness or illness to a group. Another theory suggests a physiological link, whereby the yawn maintains mental efficiency by regulating the brain temperature through a cooling mechanism (Palagi, Leone, Mancici & Ferarri, 2009). However, a study by Gallup & Gallup jr. (2008) has shown inconclusive results for this theory. Another theory suggests that yawning is due to arousal. Matikainen and Elo (2007) report that yawning increases arousal and helps the individual to waken up. They suggest that it is due to connections between the mouth and the neck which when stretched stimulates the carotid body responsible for oxygen homeostasis. However, research by Guiggisberg et al (2007) found opposing research and their results showed that arousal levels decreased after yawns. It is clear that further research needs to be conducted to find the causes of yawns, and it has been shown that there is possibly more than one answer for this problem. However conclusive evidence for any theory is yet to be found. Contagious yawning Seeing, hearing or even thinking about another person yawning can trigger a yawn, contagious yawns occur in 40-60% of human adults but its primary reason and function is still unknown. Some advancement nevertheless, has been made to explain its cause. The advance in research into contagious yawning has come from the discovery of mirror neurons (Arnott, Singhal & Goodale, 2009). These are cells which are located in the posterior inferior frontal gyrus (pIGF) and are active when an individual sees another perform and action. They activate in the same was as they do when an individual performs the task themselves. It is proposed that mirror neurons enable individuals to understand others experiences and emotional states. This research therefore suggests that seeing or hearing a yawn activates this area of the brain and so initiates a yawning action. It has also been proposed that as mirror neurons help to understand emotional states, it is closely linked with empathy. This means that contagious yawning could be linked to empathy too. Contagious yawning and empathy This study has been conducted to assess the relationship between contagious yawning and empathy. Previous research highlights a strong relationship. Arnott et al (2009) investigated empathy and auditory contagious yawning and their results show a positive correlation between the two with more yawns elicited by those who scored higher on the empathy scale given. The relationship was modest but still significant below . 05. Also Periol & Monaca (2006) point out that contagious yawning doesn’t occur in species that cant recognise themselves in the mirror, nor can infants under two, suggesting that sense of self is required which is a key element to understanding others. Other research has shown that those with autistic spectrum disorder, and schizophrenia are unable to yawn contagiously as much as controls and that this is due to lack of empathy (Haker & Rossler, 2008). The premise of this study is to add to current research by expanding on Arnott et al’s research, by using visual stimuli. This study will test further the relationship between empathy and contagious yawning as this seems to be the area with most evidence. If the pilot data suggests a trend consistent with the current data then it will suggest further research and a full study should be conducted, however if the results gained show little evidence for a relationship then it will be suggested that other areas of contagious yawning should be looked into in more depth to find its possible cause. Hypotheses 1a) Contagious yawning is elicited from visual stimuli a) Higher amounts of contagious yawning will be present in those with higher levels of empathy. Null hypotheses 1b) Visual stimuli does not elicit contagious yawning 2b) There is no difference in amount of contagious yawning and level of empathy. Method 30 Stirling University students took part. This experiment was a between participants design. Independent variable is number of yawns produced in each condition. Dependant variable is empathy score The experiment consisted of two parts. To begin, each participant was required to complete the interpersonal reactivity index questionnaire to determine empathy levels. From this the participants were classified as empathetic or non empathetic and form the two experimental groups (mean was calculated and sample split above and below the mean). After the empathy questionnaire was completed, the experimental phase began which contained two conditions, firstly a yawning condition (test phase) whereby participants were shown a slide show of 15 yawning faces each slide lasting 10seconds. Within the time period the participant was required to focus on each face and rate how many times the face made them feel like yawning or actually yawn. Secondly, participants were given a neutral condition whereby a similar slide show was given but with 15 neutral expressions. This was given as a control for the test phase so that condition effects could be tested for. If a similar frequency of yawn was observed in both phases then the yawns wouldn’t be classed as contagious, and attributed to boredom rather than condition. The two phases were reversed for half the participants for counterbalancing and also to aid understanding of when contagious yawning had occurred- neutral phase was not always last which may have indicated boredom, so results are more reliable. The analysis was in two parts firstly, the frequency of yawning was compared in each condition to determine if visual stimuli induced contagious yawning in the test phase compared to the neutral. Secondly, the analyses compared empathetic participants with non empathetic participants to test if empathy was related to contagious yawning. Examples of stimuli: Neutral phase Yawning phase [pic] [pic] All images contained a full face and expressions were face on to the participant in attempt to maintain validity for each phase. Results | Hypothesis 1 Contagious yawning is elicited from visual stimuli Tests of normality showed that there was significance for yawning and so parametric tests were conducted. Graph 1 shows that there was a higher amount of yawns produced in the yawning condition than the neutral condition and the Wilcoxon test shows there was significantly different result. Z= -2. 722, p. 006 Graph 1 Total amount of yawing produced in each condition [pic] The significant difference found between yawning in the yawn condition and the neutral condition shows that contagious yawning occurred to visual stimuli, and the null hypothesis can be rejected. Therefore further analyses can be conducted into empathy and contagious yawning. Hypothesis 2 Higher amounts of contagious yawning will be present in those with higher levels of empathy. Graph 2 shows the relationship between the amount of yawns produced and empathy scores. Those with high empathy scores (62+) yawned more in the yawning condition compared to those with low empathy scores. However, the graph also shows similar amounts of yawning between empathy groups in the neutral condition. Graph 2 Total amount of yawning produced in each condition, split by empathy score. [pic] Due to small sample size and the data having an abnormal distribution a spearman’s rho test for correlation was conducted. It showed no significant relationship between empathy score and number of yawns produced in each condition, p= . 27 with a correlation of . 259, in neutral condition and p=. 686, with a correlation of . 96 in the yawn condition. Therefore the null hypothesis has to be accepted. Discussion Previous research has suggested that contagious yawning is due to empathy and a higher level of empathy suggests the individual is more likely to contagiously yawn. This study aimed to determine if this was found with visual stimuli in the form of consecutive images of individuals yawning on a screen. The study tested to see if contagious yawning could be induced by images and compared the results to number of yawns produced by images of neural expressions in the same format. The study also aimed to contribute to the existing knowledge on the relationship between empathy and contagious yawning. Due to the small sample size and the test for normality showing that there wasn’t a normal distribution of the data, the statistics performed were limited, and are not generalisable to the overall population. The results show that there was a significant difference between the two conditions and more yawns were produced in the yawning condition compared to the neutral. The study was conducted in a way that yawns produced by boredom could be controlled for. If it was the case that yawns were produced due to boredom then a similar frequency would be observed in both conditions especially as the conditions were counterbalanced. The results were highly significant (p=. 006) showing that yawns can be attributed to contagious yawning and not boredom, therefore the null hypothesis could be rejected and the hypothesis that yawning stimuli induces contagious yawning can be accepted. This contributes to the body of research on contagious yawning especially as Arnott et al (2009) has already shown contagious yawning can be elicited to auditory stimuli. This study, compared empathy scores with frequency of yawns in each condition to determine a relationship between the two as proposed by Haker & Rossler (2008), as well as in the study by Arnott et al. This study used the interpersonal reactivity index questionnaire to determine levels of empathy and the mean score was calculated in order to form two experimental groups of high and low empathy. This was only to test for a trend and is understood that due to the abnormal distribution of scores in the data, any results cannot be generalised, as the two experimental groups for empathy are not normally distributed. The results shown in graph 2, clearly show no difference between frequency of yawns and level of empathy especially in the neutral condition where the frequency of yawns for each empathy group are virtually the same. A slight difference is seen in the yawning condition and at a glance looks to suggest that higher empathy scores result in more yawns produced however with a closer look at the frequencies, it is clear that there is only a difference of one or two yawns and the statistical analysis shows no significant difference between empathy and yawns in both conditions. However it should be noted that the correlation conducted cannot be relied on too heavily due to the small sample size and so it can still be concluded that the graph shows a possible trend that for high empathy individuals, contagious yawning is more common. Especially as the graph shows a difference in similarity of empathy group based on condition (neutral shows no difference at all whereas yawn condition shows slight difference) Even though significance is not met and for this study the null hypothesis has to be accepted, the nature of the data and tests performed show that the results are not conclusive and trends can still be relied upon. There are however many limitations to this study. Clearly, with the study being a pilot for future research, the sample size was low and so generalisable results could not be hoped for however methodological improvements could be made to make trends found more reliable. Firstly, only one measure of empathy was used and so empathy scores were only based on specific answers to questions. Arnott et al used several in their study giving a better indication of empathy however due to the small scale of the study and limitations on resources meant only one could be found. The power point slides contained many faces and it was difficult to find yawning faces which looked like yawns and not open mouthed expressions, conveying a yawn through an image was much more complex than anticipated. Another point to consider was the nature of how the study was portrayed, the emphasis on yawning was placed from the beginning and so as one participant remarked he knew it was about yawning so he was thinking about it a lot in the first condition so even thought he was looking at neutral faces, he yawned as he was thinking about it. This shows how contagious yawning can be and how our results can be skewed. For further research, better conditions must be met and participants told of the premise of the study after two conditions had been undertaken. The self report table given to the participants during the study whereby they noted how many times they yawned or felt like yawning may need to include other contagious acts like laughing, to avoid yawns being induced by thinking. This would mean that further studies into contagious yawning would require more expressions to test the participant and so they don’t constantly think about how much they are yawning. Either that or possibly use a camera to record yawns so the participants focus is consistently on the stimuli. Conclusion The results show that visual stimuli can induce contagious yawning and so can aid further research when creating a method of testing yawning. The results obtained from empathy and contagious yawning although in significant, still suggest a trend and so could be further studied if more participant were used and a better methodology was introduced. The pilot study has shown the possibility of a link between contagious yawning and empathy and so needs to be further investigated. Bibliography Arnott, S. R. , Singhal, A. , Goodale, M. A. (2009), An investigation of auditory contagious yawning, Cognitive, Affective & Behavioural Neuroscience 9 (3) 335-342 Baenninger, R. (1987). Some comparative aspects of yawning in Betta splendens, Homo sapiens, Panthera leo, and Papio sphinx. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 101, 349-354. Gallup, A. C. , Gallup, G. G, Jr (2008) Yawning and thermoregulation. Physiology and Behaviour 95 10-16. Guggisberg, A. G. ,Mathis, J. , Herrmann, U. S. , Hess, C. W (2007). The functional relationship between yawning and vigilance. Behavioural brain research  179 (1) 159-66. Haker, H. & Rossler, W. (2009) Empathy in schizophrenia: impaired resonance. European Archive of Psychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience, 259, 352-361. Palagi, E. , Leone, A. , Mancini, G. , Ferrari, P. F. , (2009). Contagious yawning in gelada baboons as a possible expression of empathy. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 106 (46) 19262-7. Perriol, M. P. & Monaca, C. (2006) One person yawning sets off everyone else. Journal of Neurological Neurosurgical Psychiatry. 77) 3 3 Matikainen, J. , Elo, H (2008). Does yawning increase arousal through mechanical stimulation of the carotid body? Medical Hypotheses 70 488–492 | | |[pic] | | | | | Top of Form ———————– Condition Mean number of yawns Mean number of yawns

Bae Hbr

In 1992, two years into construction, the project’s top managers recommended inclusion of an airport-wide integrated baggage-handling system that could dramatically improve the efficiency of luggage delivery. Originally contracted by United Airlines to cover its operations, the system was to be expanded to serve the entire airport. It was expected that the integrated system would improve ground time efficiency, reduce close-out time for hub operations, and decrease time-consuming manual baggage sorting and handling. There were, however, a number of risks inherent in the endeavor: the scale of the large project size; the enormous complexity of the expanded system; the newness of the technology; the large number of resident entities to be served by the same system; the high degree of technical and project definition uncertainty; and the short time span for completion. Due to its significant experience implementing baggage-handling technology on a smaller scale, BAE Automated Systems Inc. , an engineering consulting and manufacturing company based in Carollton, Texas, was awarded the contract. Construction problems kept the new airport from opening on the originally scheduled opening date in October 1993. Subsequently, problems with the implementation of the baggage system forced delays in the opening of the airport another three times in seven months. In May 1994, under growing pressure from shareholders, the business community, Denver residents, Federal 1Fred Isaac, Federal Aviation Administration regional administrator, quoted in â€Å"Denver Still Working Out Kinks as Its First Birthday Arrives,† USA Today (February 28, 1996), p. 4b. Fred Renville, United Airlines employee quoted in â€Å"Denver Still Working Out Kinks as Its First Birthday Arrives,† USA Today (February 28, 1996), p. 4b. Assistant Professor Ramiro Montealegre and Research Associate H. James Nelson of the University of Colorado at Boulder, Research Associate Carin Isabel Knoop, and Professor Lynda M. Applegate prepared this case as the basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate e ither effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation. Some names have been disguised. Copyright  © 1996 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, call 1-800-545-7685 or write Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA 02163. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any means—electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise—without the permission of Harvard Business School. 1 Purchased by Ashley Matcheck ([emailprotected] com) on April 11, 2012 396-311 BAE Automated Systems (A): Denver International Airport Baggage-Handling System Aviation Administration (FAA) commissioners, and the tenant airlines and concessionaires, Denver mayor Wellington Webb announced that he was hiring the German firm Logplan to help assess the state of the automated baggage system. In July, Logplan issued an 11-page report to the City of Denver that characterized BAE’s system as â€Å"highly advanced† and â€Å"theoretically capable of living up to its promised â€Å"capacities, services and performances,† but acknowledged mechanical and electrical problems that â€Å"make it most improbable to achieve a stable and reliable operation. Logplan suggested that it would take approximately five months to get the complete BAE system working reliably. It also suggested that a backup system of tugs, carts, and conveyor belts could be constructed in less than five months. In August 1994, Mayor Webb approved the construction of a backup baggage system. At the same time, he notified BAE of a $12,000-a-day penalty for not fi nishing the baggage system by DIA’s original October 29, 1993 completion date. Webb also demanded that BAE pay for the $50 million conventional tug-and-cart baggage system. Gene Di Fonso, President of BAE, knew that his company could demonstrate that flaws in the overall design of the airport and an unsystematic approach to project changes had affected implementation of the integrated baggage system. He wondered whether he should just cancel the contract and cut his losses, or attempt to negotiate with the city for the support required to finish the system as specified, despite the severe deterioration in communication and rising hostility. Could the problems with the automated system be overcome with the dedication of additional resources? Given that the system represented a significant departure from conventional technology, would reducing its size and complexity facilitate resolution of the problems that plagued it? And, if the city could be persuaded to accept a simplified system, would the tenant airlines, particularly those with hubbing operations that had been promised more advanced functionality and better performance, be likely to sue? Building the Most Efficient Airport in the World Until about 1970, Denver’s Stapleton Airport had managed to accommodate an ever-growing number of airplanes and passengers. Its operational capacity was severely limited by runway layout; Stapleton had two parallel north-south runways and two additional parallel east-west runways that accommodated only commuter air carriers. Denver’s economy grew and expanded greatly in the early 1980s, consequent to booms in the oil, real estate, and tourism industries. An aging and saturated Stapleton Airport was increasingly seen as a liability that limited the attractiveness of the region to the many businesses that were flocking to it. Delays had become chronic. Neither the north-south nor east-west parallel runways had sufficient lateral separation to accommodate simultaneous parallel arrival streams during poor weather conditions when instrument flight rules were in effect. This lack of runway separation and the layout of Stapleton’s taxiways tended to cause delays during high-traffic periods, even when weather conditions were good. Denver’s geographic location and the growing size of its population and commerce made it an attractive location for airline hubbing operations. At one point, Stapleton had housed four airline hubs, more than any other airport in the United States. In poor weather and during periods of hightraffic volume, however, its limitations disrupted connection schedules that were important to maintaining these operations. A local storm could easily congest air traffic across the entire United States. 3 3According to James Barnes [1993], â€Å"By 1994, Stapleton was one of the top five most constrained airports in the US. There were over 50,000 hours of delay in 1988 and by 1997 the FAA had projected that Stapleton would experience over 100,000 hours of delay per year. † 2 Purchased by Ashley Matcheck ([emailprotected] com) on April 11, 2012 BAE Automated Systems (A): Denver International Airport Baggage-Handling System 396-311 The City and County of Denver had determined in the mid-1970s that Stapleton International Airport was in need of expansion or replacement. In July 1979, a study to assess the airports needs was commissioned by the City of Denver to the Denver Regional Council of Governments. Upon completion of the study in 1983, a report was issued saying that, due to its size and geographic location, and strong commitments by United and Continental Airlines, Denver would remain a significant hub for at least one major U. S. arrier. The study recommended expansion of Stapleton’s capacity. Political Situation4 The City of Denver’s 1983 mayoral race precipitated initiatives to improve the airfield infrastructure. Three candidates were vying for mayor: Monte Pascoe, Dale Tooley, and Frederico Pena. Pascoe, a prominent Denver attorney and former State Democratic Party co-chair, seized upon the airport i ssue, forcing other candidates to adopt stronger positions on airport expansion than they might have otherwise. 5 Pena and Tooley, however, drew the highest numbers of votes in the general election, and were forced into a runoff. At the persistent urging of the Colorado Forum (a collection of 50 of the state’s top business executives), Pena and Tooley signed a joint statement committing themselves to airport expansion. Pena won the runoff. Committed by a public promise that could have been enforced, if necessary, by the most highly motivated members of the region’s business leadership, Pena immediately restated his intent to expand Stapleton. The City of Denver and neighboring Adams County began to develop plans for long-term airport development in 1984. In 1985, a new site northeast of Denver was chosen. Consummation of the airport siting issue, however, was left to Adams County voters, which had to vote to permit the City of Denver to annex property therein. The city hired a consulting firm to help organize its resources and its efforts to work through the legal process. The data that was gathered through the master planning and environmental assessment later proved useful for public education. An â€Å"Annexation Agreement† between Adams County and the City of Denver was reached on April 21, 1988. Adams Country voters approved a plan to let Denver annex 43. 3 square miles for the construction of an airport. In a special election on May 16, 1989, voters of Denver endorsed a â€Å"New Airport† by a margin of 62. 7% to 37. 3%. According to Edmond, â€Å"Those two referendums passed largely on the merits of the economic benefits: jobs and sales tax revenues. † Economic Considerations A number of trends and events in the mid-1980s alarmed bank economists and other of the regions business leaders in the mid-1980s. The collapse of oil shale ventures between 1982 and 1986 saw mining employment fall from 42,000 to 26,000 jobs, while service support jobs fell from 25,300 jobs to 13,700. Construction jobs fell from 50,700 to 36,600 jobs, and the value of private construction plummeted from $24 billion to $9. 5 billion. 7 A lackluster economy led many government officials in counties and municipalities as well as in Denver to embark upon an unprecedented policy of massive public construction to save the region from what was regarded in 1987 as an economic free-fall. A $180 million-plu s municipal bond was issued for public improvements, including a new downtown library, neighborhood and major roadway improvements, and a host of overdue infrastructure investments. During the same period, 4Extracted from: Moore, S. T. : â€Å"Between Growth Machine and Garbage Can: Determining Whether to Expand the Denver Airport, 1982-1988,† Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, November 4, 1994. 5Ibid. 6 7 Colorado Business Outlook Forum, University of Colorado School of Business, 1990. Small Area Employment Estimates; Construction Review, U. S. Department of Commerce, 1990 3 Purchased by Ashley Matcheck ([emailprotected] com) on April 11, 2012 396-311 BAE Automated Systems (A): Denver International Airport Baggage-Handling System he Pena administration moved decisively to confront an increasingly aggressive Chamber of Commerce leadership that was promoting airport relocation. The determination of the â€Å"pro-New-Airport† clan was growing. The project was being marketed as a technologically advanced, state-of-the-art structure to draw businesses, import federal capital, and fund the creation of new job s with bonded debts to overcome the short-term decline in the economy. The airport was to become a grandiose project to revive the Colorado economy and a master showcase for the Public Works Department. The entire business community, recalled a member of the Mayors administrative team: The Chamber of Commerce, members of the city council, the mayor, and state legislators, participated in informational discussions with other cities that had recently built airports. [This enabled] everybody to understand the magnitude of the project. So we studied the other two airports that had been built in the United States in the last 50 years and said, Tell us everything that you went through and all the places you think there will be problems. We were not going into it blindly. Forecasts of aviation activity at Stapleton by the Airport Consultant team, the FAA, and others, however, did not anticipate events such as a new phase of post-deregulation consolidation, the acquisition in 1986 of Frontier Airlines by Texas Air (the owner of Continental), significant increases in air fares for flights in and out of Stapleton, and the bankruptcy of Continental. Consequently, the level of aviation activity in Denver was overestimated. Instead of rising, Stapleton’s share of total U. S. domestic passenger enplanements fell 4% per year from 1986 through 1989. 8 The Master Plan The City of Denvers approach to preparing a master plan for the airport was typical. â€Å"One hires the best consultants on airfield layout, noise impacts, terminal layout, on-site roadways, off-site roadways, cost estimating, financial analysis, and forecasting,† observed DIA administrator Gail Edmond. â€Å"They brainstorm and generate as many alternate layouts as possible. † Alternatives were discussed and eliminated at periodic joint working sessions, and a technical subcommittee was organized to gather input from the eventual airport users, airlines, pilots, and the FAA. â€Å"Everybody knows how to begin an airport master plan,† Edmond added. Following a bid, the consulting contract was awarded to the joint venture of Greiner, Inc. and Morrison-Knudsen Engineers for their combined expertise in the fields of transportation and construction. The consulting team, working under the direction of the DIA Director of Aviation, focused first on four elements: site selection; the master plan; the environmental assessment; and developing support by educating the public on economic benefit. The final master plan presented to the city by the team in the fall of 1987 called for the construction of the world’s most efficient airport. It was to be created from the ground up with no predetermined limitations. The plan was to allow the airport to grow and expand without compromising efficiency. Twice the size of Manhattan at 53 square miles, the nations largest airport was to be designed for steady traffic flow in all weather conditions. It was to comprise a terminal with east and west buildings joined by an atrium structure, three concourses, an automated underground people mover, and five parallel 12,000-foot-long runways on which as many as 1,750 planes could take off and land daily. Its flow-through traffic patterns would allow planes to land, taxi to concourse gates, and take 8 Furthermore, when selling the project to voters, planners at one point forecast up to 36 weekly flights to Europe by 1993. The number recorded in 1993, however, was four. The number of passengers departing form Denver was to rise from 16 million in 1985 to some 26 million by 1995. The 1994 figure, however, was about the same as the number of passengers in 1985, or half of Stapleton’s capacity. 4 Purchased by Ashley Matcheck ([emailprotected] om) on April 11, 2012 BAE Automated Systems (A): Denver International Airport Baggage-Handling System 396-311 off again all in one direction. The ultimate buildout, projected for the year 2020, was to include up to 12 full service runways, more than 200 gates, and a capacity of 110 million passengers annually. Estimated cost (excluding land acquisition and pre-1990 planning costs) was $2 billion. By the end of 1991, the estimated cost had incr eased to $2. 66 billion. Plans called for the projects completion by the fall of 1993. In September 1989, Federal officials signed a $60 million grant agreement for the new airport, which was to be financed in multiple ways—by issuing revenue bonds and securing federal grants— supplemented by a sizable investment by the city [county of Denver 1991]. Estimated federal grants for the new airport originally totaled $501 million. Portions of these were forthcoming from the FAA, for federal fiscal year 1990 in the amount of $90 million and for federal fiscal year 1991 in the amount of $25 million. The remainder of the $501 million letter of intent was to be received on an annual basis through fiscal year 1997. The revenue bonds assumed the â€Å"Date of Beneficial Occupancy† (DBO) to be January 1, 1994, with bond repayments to begin on that date. At that time, the city determined that DIA would meet the DBO no later than October 31, 1993. A member of the Mayor’s administrative team described the approach. What we did was plan the DBO date and then we planned an extra six months just in case there was a lag in the opening, which, in essence, allowed us to create stability in the market. The other thing we did was that we conservatively financed and filled every reserve account to the maximum. So we borrowed as much money as we could at the lower interest rate and were able to average the debt cost down, not up, as we thought it would be. A Build-Design Project By the time construction began at DIA in November 1989, a transfer of authority was taking place in the City of Denver. Wellington Webb was elected the new mayor. According to one of his assistants, the Pena administration had announced that the airport would be operational in October 1993. â€Å"This was a build-design project, which means that we were building the airport [while] we were designing it,† he explained. Because of the delays early on in the project, we had to accelerate construction immediately. There was a lot of pressure and too many players. This was an airport built by committee. We had regular meetings to straighten things out, but it didn’t always work. † Although the Webb administration inherited the airport project without a commitment on the part of the major carriers, the support and input of concerned airlines were absolutely key, not only financially but also in terms of input on overall airport layout, scope, and capacity, and supporting systems such as fueling and baggage handling. Denver launched the DIA program without specific commitments from either of Stapleton airports two major tenant airlines, United and Continental, which together accounted for more than 70% of existing passenger traffic. Continental committed to the new airport in February 1990, United in December 1991. Fundamental changes were made to the airport layout plan and facilities (some already under construction) to accommodate the operational needs of these carriers. The Webb administration followed the predecessor administration’s emphasis on assuring that the project’s greatest beneficiaries would be local businesses. The desire was to involve as many individual firms as practicable and to use Denver area talent. It was reasoned that local talent was easily accessible to the program management team (PMT), knew Denver building codes and practices, and had available the necessary professional labor pool to accomplish the design in accordance with the demanding schedule. In addition, existing law stated that 30% minority-owned firms and 6% women-owned firms had to participate in a public works program. The result was a contracting philosophy that maximized opportunities for regional businesses and the local workforce to compete for the work. At least five of 60 contracts awarded for the design of DIA went to Denverarea firms. These 60 design contracts generated 110 construction contracts. Eighty-eight professional service contracts also had to be coordinated. Many local firms had to be hired and the program was 5 Purchased by Ashley Matcheck ([emailprotected] com) on April 11, 2012 396-311 BAE Automated Systems (A): Denver International Airport Baggage-Handling System chopped up into many small projects. Involvement totaled 200 to 300 firms and reached 400 during the construction phase. Five different firms designed the runways, four the terminal. The citys emphasis on encouraging everyone to compete and yet be part of the project increased the potential for interface and coordination problems. Denver’s flat economy led the administration to keep construction money within the city. Although this benefited the city, it introduced an additional burden on administration. As many as 40-50 concurrent contracts involved many interrelated milestones and contiguous or overlapping operational areas. The estimated daily on-site work force population exceeded 2,500 workers for a 15 to 18-month period beginning in mid-1991 and peaked at between 9,000 and 10,000 in mid-1992. Adding to the human resource coordination problems was a forecasted 4,000 deliveries daily. Construction volume for six months in mid-1992 exceeded $100 million per month. The prolonged period of assessment and negotiation prior to final approval of the project, and the financial plan selected (which required that bond repayments begin on January 1, 1994), pressured the PMT to push the project ahead at all cost. Because the project had to assume the characteristics of a â€Å"fast-track† project early in the construction startup, the compressed design period precipitated a more dynamic construction effort han might be anticipated for a competitively bid, fixed price program. Reliance on a design/build method for the project was, according to one DIA official, unusual because projects this complex normally happen during separate stages. For example, you need to finish up the site selection before you begin the master planning. † Moreover, communication channels between th e city, project management team, and consultants were neither well defined or controlled. If a contractor fell behind, a resident engineer who reported to one of the area managers said, the resident engineer would alert the contractor and document this. The resident engineer would document what would have to be done and what additional resources were necessary to get back on schedule and finish the contract on time. As a public agency it was enormous, the amount of documentation that we did. I don’t know how many trees we cut down just for this project. The resident engineer had about five to eight 12-drawer filing cabinets of documentation and this was nothing compared to what the area manager had. It was just incredible. There were at least four to six copies of everything. The scheduling manager described the evolution of the tracking system that was used. One of the biggest problems we had was keeping track of all the changes. So we developed a database system that was installed at each one of the resident engineer’s trailers and each contract administrator was then charged with keeping that system up to date and feeding us disks, which we would then merge together periodically to produce an integrated report. But every party had developed their own tracking system before the start of the project. That worked well for each group, but there was no way to take each one of these divergent systems and combine it into one, comprehensive report. So when we introduced the change tracking system everybody said, fine, that’s wonderful, and I’ll update it when I get to it and when I get time. It took three years to implement the tracking system. Project Management In a fast-moving, ever-changing environment such as the development of a new airport, the management structure must be able to rapidly produce engineering alternatives and the supporting 6 Purchased by Ashley Matcheck ([emailprotected] com) on April 11, 2012 BAE Automated Systems (A): Denver International Airport Baggage-Handling System 396-311 ost and schedule data. 9 But because DIA was financed by many sources and was a public works program, project administrators had to balance administrative, political, and social imperatives. 10 The City of Denver staff and consultant team shared leadership of the project and coordinated the initial facets of DIA design. â€Å"The initial thought, reflected one staff member, was that the city staff would do their thing and the consulting staff do theirs and later we would coordinate. It became evident within a very short time that we were doing duplicate duties, which was inefficient. Finally the city decided to coordinate resources. † The city selected a team of city employees and consultants and drafted a work scope document that clearly separated the city’s from the consultants’ responsibilities. The elements the city did not delegate to consultants included ultimate policy and facility decisions, approval of payments, negotiation and execution of contracts, facilitation of FAA approvals, affirmative action, settlement of contractor claims and disputes, selection of consultants, and utility agreements. The city delegated some elements such as value engineering, construction market analysis, claim management, on-site staff and organization, and state-of-the-art project control (computerized management of budget and schedule). Exhibit 1 depicts the DIA management structure. The program management team became the organization dedicated to overseeing planning and development for the new airport. Headed by the associate director of aviation, the team was partially staffed by city career service employees. To add experience and capability, the city augmented the PMT with personnel from the joint venture of Greiner Engineering and MorrisonKnudsen Engineers, the consulting team. Observed one program management team member, â€Å"This working partnership of the City of Denver and consulting joint venture team developed into a fully integrated single organization, capitalizing on the best to be offered by all participants, and optimizing the use of personnel resources. † DIA’s operational project structure comprised five different areas subdivided into smaller units. The working areas were: site development (earthmoving, grading, and drainage); roadways and on-grade parking (service roads, on-airport roads, and off-airport roads connecting to highways); airfield paving; building design (people-mover/baggage-handler, tunnel, concourses, passenger bridge, terminal, and parking); and utility/special systems and other facilities (electrical transmission, oil, and gas line removal and relocation). An area manager controlled construction within each area. Area managers were responsible for the administration of all assigned contracts and, in coordination with other area managers, for management of the portion of the overall site in which their work took place. United Airlines’ Baggage System From the public’s perspective, the â€Å"friendliness† of any airport is measured by time. No matter how architecturally stimulating a new airport structure, the perception of business or leisure travelers is often registered in terms of efficiency in checking luggage at the departure area or waiting to claim a bag in the arrival area. The larger the airport, the more critical the efficient handling of baggage. Remote concourses connected by underground tunnels present special problems for airport planners and operators because of the great distances passengers and baggage must travel. The purpose of an airport being to move passengers as efficiently as possible, moving bags as quickly is 9 The DIA project used the so-called fast-tracking method, which made it possible to compress some activities along the critical path and manage the construction project as a series of overlapping tasks. 0 These included considerations such as affirmative action, local participation, neighborhood concerns, civic pride, input from the disabled community, art, secondary employment benefits of contract packaging, concern for the environment, and political interest. 7 Purchased by Ashley Matcheck ([emailprotected] com) on April 11, 2012 396-311 BAE Automated Systems (A): Denver International Airport Baggage-Handling System part and pa rcel of that responsibility. Rapid transport of frequent flyers accomplishes very little if bags are left behind. DIAs Concourse A, which was to house Continental Airlines, was situated some 400 meters, and United Airlines’ Concourse B nearly 1,000 meters, north of the main terminal. Concourse C, home to other carriers including American, Delta, Northwest, America West, and TWA, sat parallel to the other two concourses more than 1,600 meters north of the main terminal. The initial project design did not incorporate an airport-wide baggage system; the airport expected the individual airlines to build their own systems as in most other American airports. 1 United Airlines, which in June 1991 signed on to use DIA as its second-largest hub airport, proceeded to do just that. Needing an automated baggage handling system if it was to turn aircraft around in less than 30 minutes, United, in December 1991, commissioned BAE Automatic Systems, Inc. , a world leader in the design and implementation of material handling systems, to develop an automated baggage handling system for its B Concourse at D IA. The contract, which included engineering and early parts procurement only, was valued at $20 million; and the task was estimated to be completed in two and one-half years. We began working at DIA under a contract directly with United Airlines, recalled Di Fonso. Obviously, United Airlines has experience with airports. They concluded that the schedule had gotten totally out of control from the standpoint of baggage and they acted to serve their own needs, basically to protect themselves. We contracted with United and were already designing their portion of the system before the city went out for competitive bidding. BAE was founded as a division of Docutel Corporation in 1968. Docutel, which had developed the Telecar (a track-mounted automated baggage system), constructed an automated baggage system for United Airlines at San Francisco airport in 1978. When Docutel ran into financial difficulties during this installation, United asked Boeing, a major supplier of its aircraft, to take over the company. Boeing agreed and the new company, a wholly-owned subsidiary dubbed Boeing Airport Equipment, completed the San Francisco installation. In 1982, Boeing sold the company to its senior management, which renamed it BAE Automated Systems. In August 1985, BAE became an operating unit of Clarkson Industries, a wholly-owned subsidiary of London-based BTR plc. BTR plc (formerly British Tire and Rubber), was a $10 billion conglomerate with global interests in building, paper and printing products, and agricultural and aircraft equipment. In 1994, BAEs 365 employees worked on projects across the United States and in Europe and Australia. In-house engineering, manufacturing, and field support capabilities enabled BAE to develop, design, manufacture, install, and support every project it undertook from start to finish. BAE also provided consulting, engineering, and management services for airport projects and a variety of material handling applications. With sales of $100 million in 1994, up from approximately $40 million in 1991, BAE accounted for 90% of U. S. baggage sorting equipment sales. Between 1972 and 1994, the company had successfully designed, manufactured, and installed nearly 70 automated baggage handling systems (worth almost $500 million dollars) at major airports in the United States, in New York, Dallas-Fort Worth, Chicago, San Francisco, Atlanta, Miami, Newark, and Pittsburgh. It had also installed systems in Vancouver and London and was selected, in 1992, as a consultant to the $550 million main terminal for the New Seoul Metropolitan Airport in South Korea. BAE was a very self-contained, integrated company structured along two business lines: manufacturing and engineering. Its approximately 200,000 square foot manufacturing facility was capable of producing nearly all of the components required by BAE systems save motors, gearboxes, and bearings. The engineering department was structured according to major projects. Each project was assigned a project manager who reported directly to the company president. 1 Rifkin, G. : â€Å"What Really Happened at Denver’s Airport,† Forbes, SAP Supplement, August 29, 1994. 8 Purchased by Ashley Matcheck ([emailprotected] com) on April 11, 2012 BAE Automated Systems (A): Denver International Airport Baggage-Handling System 396-311 Implementing an Integrated Baggage-Handling System BAE had already commence d work on Uniteds baggage system when the PMT recognized the potential benefits of an airport-wide integrated baggage system. Moreover, as one DIA senior manager explained, â€Å"airlines other than United simply were not coming forward with plans to develop their own baggage systems. Airport planners and consultants began to draw up specifications and the city sent out a request for bids. Of 16 companies contacted, both in the United States and abroad, only three responded. A consulting firm recommended against the submitted designs, on the grounds that the configurations would not meet the airport’s needs. BAE was among the companies that had decided not to bid for the job. BAE had installed the Telecar system at a number of other airports and the basic technologies of the Telecar, laser barcode readers, and conveyor belt systems were not new. What was new was the size and complexity of the system. A grand airport like DIA needs a complex baggage system, explained Di Fonso , Therefore the type of technology to be used for such a system is the kind of decision that must be made very early in a project. If there is a surprise like no bidders there is still time to react. At DIA, this never happened. Working with United Airlines, we had concluded that destination-coded vehicles moving at high speed was the technology needed. But quite honestly, although we had that technology developed, its implementation in a complex project like this would have required significantly greater time than the city had left available. A United project manager concurred: â€Å"BAE told them from the beginning that they were going to need at least one more year to get the system up and running, but no one wanted to hear that. † The City of Denver was getting the same story from the technical advisers to the Franz Josef Strauss Airport in Munich. The Munich Airport had an automated baggage system, but one far less complex than DIA’s. Nevertheless, Munich’s technical advisors had spent two years testing the system and the system had been running 24 hours a day for six months before the airport opened. Formulating Intentions As BAE was already working on United’s automated baggage handling system and enjoyed a world-wide reputation as a superior baggage system builder, Denver approached the company. BAE was asked to study how the United concept could be expanded into an integrated airport system that could serve the other carriers in the various concourses. BAE presented the City of Denver with a proposal to develop the â€Å"most complex automated baggage system ever built,† according to Di Fonso. It was to be effective in delivering bags to and from passengers, and efficient in terms of operating reliability, maintainability, and future flexibility. The system was to be capable of directing bags (including suitcases of all sizes, skis, and golf clubs) from the main terminal through a tunnel into a remote concourse and directly to a gate. Such efficient delivery would save precious ground time, reduce close-out time for hub operations, and cut time-consuming manual baggage sorting and handling. Although an automated system was more expensive initially than simple tugs and baggage carts, it was expected that it would reduce the manpower which was required to distribute bags to the correct locations. Bags unloaded from an aircraft arriving at a particular concourse would barely be touched by human hands. Moved through the airport at speeds up to 20 mph, they would be waiting when passengers arrived at the terminal. To prove the capability of its mechanical aspects, and demonstrate the proposed system to the airlines and politicians, BAE built a prototype automated baggage handling system in a 50,000 square foot warehouse near its manufacturing plant in Carrollton, Texas. The prototype system convinced Chief Airport Engineer Walter Slinger that the automated system would work. [The City of Denver] approached us based on one core concept, recalled Di Fonso. They wanted to have a fully integrated, airport-wide baggage system. The city 9 Purchased by Ashley Matcheck ([emailprotected] com) on April 11, 2012 396-311 BAE Automated Systems (A): Denver International Airport Baggage-Handling System had two major concerns. First, they had no acceptable proposal. Second, United was probably going to go ahead and build what it needed and the rest of the airport would have been equipped with something else. Di Fonso continued, When we arrived on the scene, we were faced with fully defined project specs, which obviously in the long run proved to be a major planning error. The city had fallen into a trap, which historically architects and engineers tend to fall into as they severely underplay the importance and significance of some of the requirements of a baggage system, that is, arranging things for the space into which it must fit, accommodating the weight it may impose on the building structure, the power it requires to run, and the ventilation and air conditioning that may be necessary to dissipate the heat it generates. In April 1992, BAE was awarded the $175. 6 million contract to build the entire airport system. According to Di Fonso, company executives and city officials hammered out a deal in three intense working sessions. We placed a number of conditions on accepting the job, he observed. The design was not to be changed beyond a given date and there would be a number of freeze dates for mechanical design, software design, permanent power requirements and the like. The contract made it obvious that both signatory parties were very concerned about the ability to complete. The provisions dealt mostly with all-around access, timely completion of certain areas, provision of permanent power, provision of computer rooms. All these elements were delineated as milestones. Denver officials accepted these requirements and, in addition, committed to unrestricted access for BAE equipment. Because of the tight deadlines, BAE would have priority in any area where it needed to install the system. Di Fonso elaborated, When we entered into the contract, Continental Airlines was still under bankruptcy law protection. The city was very concerned that they would be unable to pay for their concourse. They only contracted for about 40% of the equipment that is now in concourse A, which was the concourse that Continental had leased. Beyond that, concourse C had no signatory airlines as leaseholders at the time. The city, therefore, wanted the simplest, most elementary baggage system possible for concourse C. The outputs and inputs were very, very crude, intentionally crude to keep the costs down because the city had no assurance of revenue stream at that point in time. The city did not get the airlines together or ask them what they wanted or needed to operate. The approach was more along the lines of we will build the apartment building and then you come in and rent a set of rooms. Project Organization and Management No major organizational changes to accommodate the new baggage system were deemed necessary, although some managerial adjustments were made on the DIA project. Design of the United baggage system was frozen on May 15, 1992, when the PMT assumed managerial responsibility for the integrated baggage system. The direct relationship with BAE was delegated to Working Area 4, which also had responsibility for building design efforts such as the people-mover, airside concourse building, passenger bridge main landside building complex and parking garage, and various other smaller structures. The area manager, although he had no experience in airport construction, baggage system technologies, or the introduction of new technologies, possessed vast experience in construction project control management. BAE had to change its working structure to conform to DIAs project management structure. Di Fonso explained, 10 Purchased by Ashley Matcheck ([emailprotected] com) on April 11, 2012 BAE Automated Systems (A): Denver International Airport Baggage-Handling System 396-311 There was a senior manager for each of the concourses and a manager for the main terminal. The bag system, however, traversed all of them. If I had to argue a case for right of way I would have to go to all the managers because I was traversing all four empires. In addition, because changes were happening fast at each of these sites, there was no time to have an information system to see what is concourse A deciding and what is concourse B deciding. We had to be personally involved to understand what was going on. There was no one to tie it all together and overlap all these effects because the basic organization was to manage it as discrete areas. It was pandemonium. We would keep saying that over and over again. Who is in charge? For the first two years of the project, Di Fonso was the project manager. The project was divided into three general areas of expertise: mechanical engineering, industrial control, and software design. Mechanical engineering was responsible for all mechanical components and their installation, industrial control for industrial control design, logic controller programming, and motor control panels, and software design for writing real-time process control software to manage the system. At the time the contract with BAE was signed, construction had already begun on the terminal and concourses. Substantial changes had to be made to the overall design of the terminal and some construction already completed had to be taken out and reinstalled to accommodate the expanded system. Installation of the expanded system was initially estimated to require more than $100 million in construction work. Walls had to be removed and a new floor installed in the terminal building to support the new system. Moreover, major changes in project governance were taking place during the baggage system negotiations. In May 1992, shortly after the baggage system negotiations commenced, the head of the DIA project resigned. The death in October 1992 of Chief Airport Engineer Slinger, who had been a strong proponent of the baggage system and closely involved in negotiations with BAE, also exerted a significant impact on the project. His cooperation had been essential because of the amount of heavy machinery and track that had to be moved and installed and the amount of construction work required to accommodate the system. His replacement, Gail Edmond, was selected because she had worked closely with him and knew all the players. Her managerial style, however, was quite different from Slinger’s. A Public Works manager recalled his first reaction to the change: â€Å"[The airport] is not going to be open on time. † A United Airlines project manager summarized Edmond’s challenge thus: Slinger was a real problem solver. He was controversial because of his attitude, but he was never afraid to address problems. He had a lot of autonomy and could get things done. Gail was in a completely different position. Basically, she had a good understanding of how the project was organized and who the key players were, but didn’t know much about the actual construction. Also, the city council didn’t give her anywhere near the autonomy and the authority that Slinger had and she had to get approval from the council on just about all decisions. They really tied her hands and everyone knew it. Di Fonso echoed the project managers assessment: Walter [Slinger] understood that one of the things we had to have was unrestricted access. I think he clearly understood the problem the city was facing and he understood the short timeframe under which we were operating. He was the one that accepted all of the contractual conditions, all the milestones of the original contract. He really had no opportunity to influence the outcome of this project, however, because he died within months after the contract was signed. I think Gail 11 Purchased by Ashley Matcheck ([emailprotected] com) on April 11, 2012 96-311 BAE Automated Systems (A): Denver International Airport Baggage-Handling System did an excellent job [but] she was overwhelmed. 12 She just had too much. The layers below focused inward, worrying about their own little corners of the world. â€Å"Not only did we not get the unrestricted access that was agreed upon,† Di Fonso emphasized, â€Å"we didn’t even have reas onable access. † Ten days after Slinger’s death, a BAE millwright found a truck from Hensel Phelps, the contractor building Concourse C, blocking her work site. She asked someone to move the truck or leave the keys so it could be moved. According to a BAE superintendent, â€Å"she was told that ‘This is not a BAE job and we can park anywhere we please: is that clear? ’† Elsewhere, BAE electricians had to leave work areas where concrete grinders were creating clouds of dust. Fumes from chemical sealants forced other BAE workers to flee. Di Fonso pleaded with the city for help. â€Å"We ask that the city take prompt action to assure BAE the ability to continue its work in an uninterrupted manner,† he wrote. â€Å"Without the city’s help, the delays to BAE’s work will quickly become unrecoverable. 13 To further complicate matters, the airlines began requesting changes to the system’s design even though the mechanical and software designs were supposed to be frozen. â€Å"Six months prior to opening the airport,† Di Fonso recalled, â€Å"we were still moving equipment around, changing controls, changing software design. † In August 1992, for example, United altered plans for a transfer system for bags changing planes, requesting that BAE eliminate an entire loop of track from Concourse B. Rather than two complete loops of track, United would have only one. This change saved approximately $20 million, but required a system redesign. Additional ski-claim devices and odd-size baggage elevators added in four of the six sections of the terminal added $1. 61 million to the cost of the system. One month later, Continental requested that automated baggage sorting systems be added to its west basement at an additional cost of $4. 67 million. The ski claim area length was first changed from 94 feet to 127 feet, then in January 1993, shortened to 112 feet. The first change added $295,800, the second subtracted $125,000, from the cost. The same month, maintenance tracks were added to permit the Telecars to be serviced without having to lift them off the main tracks at an additional cost of $912,000. One year later, United requested alterations to its odd-size baggage inputs—cost of the change: $432,000. Another problem was the city’s inability to supply â€Å"clean† electricity to the baggage system. The motors and circuitry used in the system were extremely sensitive to power surges and fluctuations. When electrical feedback tripped circuit breakers on hundreds of motors, an engineer was called in to design filters to correct the problem. Although ordered at that time, the filters still had not arrived several months later. A city worker had canceled a contract without realizing that the filters were part of it. The filters finally arrived in March 1994. A third, albeit disputed, complication related to Denver’s requirement, and city law, that a certain percentage of jobs be contracted to minority-owned companies. The City of Denver had denied BAE’s original contract because it did not comply with hiring requirements, where upon BAE engaged some outside contractors in lieu of BAE employees. Di Fonso estimated that this increased costs by approximately $6 million, a claim ejected by the Mayors Office of Contract Compliance. Then, in September 1993, BAE’s contract negotiations with the City of Denver over maintenance of the system resulted in a two-day strike of 300 millwrights that was joined by some 200 electricians. BAE negotiated with Denver for maintenance workers to earn $12 per hour on certai n jobs that the union contended should be worth $20 per hour. As a result, BAE lost the maintenance contract. 12 In addition to her role as Chief Airport Engineer, Edmond kept her previous responsibilities as Chief of Construction and Acting Director of Aviation. 3 Rocky Mountain News, January 29, 1995 12 Purchased by Ashley Matcheck ([emailprotected] com) on April 11, 2012 BAE Automated Systems (A): Denver International Airport Baggage-Handling System 396-311 Project Relations Much of the effort for implementing the baggage system was directed within one of the four working areas. The relationship with the management team was very poor, recalled Di Fonso. The management team had no prior baggage handling competence or experience. This was treated as a major public works project. The management team treated the baggage system as similar to pouring concrete or putting in air-conditioning ducts. When we would make our complaints about delays and access and so forth, other contractors would argue their position. The standard answer was, Go work it out among yourselves. . . . With contractors basically on their own, this led almost to anarchy. Everyone was doing his or her own thing. Another perspective was offered by a project manager from Stone Webster, a consultant to the PMT, reflecting on the work done by BAE: â€Å"This contractor simply did not respond to the obvious incredible workload they were faced with. Their inexperienced project management vastly underestimated their task. Their work ethic was deplorable. †14 PMT management insisted that access and mechanical issues weren’t the problem. They were running cars in Concourse B all summer (1993), Edmund observed. The problem was that the programming was not done and BAE had full control of the programming. †15 Lawsuits and a Backup Baggage System In February 1993, Mayor Webb delayed the scheduled October 1993 airport opening to December 19, 1993. Later, this December date was changed to March 9, 1994. Everybody got into the panic mode of trying to get to this magical date that nobody was ready for,† a senior vicepresident for BAE recalled. In September 1993, the opening was again postponed—this time until May 15, 1994. In late April 1994, the City of Denver invited reporters to observe the first test of the baggage system, without notifying BAE. Seven thousand bags were to be moved to Continentalâ€℠¢s Concourse A and United’s Concourse B. So many problems were discovered that testing had to be halted. Reporters saw piles of disgorged clothes and other personal items lying beneath the Telecar’s tracks. Most of the problems related to errors in the system’s computer software, but mechanical problems also played a part. The software that controlled the delivery of empty cars to the terminal building, for example, often sent the cars back to the waiting pool. Another problem was â€Å"jam logic† software, which was designed to shut down a section of track behind a jammed car, but instead shut down an entire loop of track. Optical sensors designed to detect and monitor cars were dirty causing the system to believe that a section of track was empty when, in fact, it had held a stopped car. Collisions between cars dumped baggage on tracks and on the floor; jammed cars jumped the track and bent the rails; faulty switches caused the Telecars to dump luggage onto the tracks or against the walls of the tunnels. After the test, Mayor Webb delayed the airport’s opening yet again, this time indefinitely. â€Å"Clearly, the automated baggage system now underway at DIA is not yet at a level that meets the requirements of the city, the airlines, or the traveling public,† the mayor stated. The city set the costs of the delay at $330,000 per month. Recognizing that his reputation was staked on his ability to have a baggage system performing to a point at which the new airport could be opened, Mayor Webb engaged, in May 1994, the German firm Logplan to assess the state of the automated baggage system. In July, Logplan isolated a loop of track that contained every feature of the automated baggage 14 15 Forbes, ASAP Supplement, August 29, 1994. Forbes, ASAP Supplement, August 29, 1994. 13 Purchased by Ashley Matcheck ([emailprotected] com) on April 11, 2012 396-311 BAE Automated Systems (A): Denver International Airport Baggage-Handling System ystem and intended to run it for an extended period to test the reliability of the Telecars. Jams on the conveyor belts and collisions between cars caused the test to be halted. The system did not run long enough to determine if there was a basic design flaw or to analyze where the problems were. Logplan recommended construction of a backup baggage system, and suggested using Rapistan Demag, a firm it had worked with in the past. Construction of a backup system was announced in August 1994. The system itself cost $10. million, but electrical upgrades and major building modifications raised the projected cost to $50 million. In the meantime, the City of Denver, as well as many major airlines, hired legal firms to assist with negotiations and future litigation. â€Å"We will have enough legal action for the rest of this century,† a city administrator mused. The City of Denver had to communicate with such parties as the United States Federal grand jury, Securities Exchange Commission, and the General Accounting Office. The federal grand jury was conducting a general investigation concerning DIA. The SEC was investigating the sale of $3. 2 billion in bonds to finance DIA’s construction, and GAO the use of Congressional funds. Di Fonso, reviewing Mayor Webb’s letter and requests that BAE pay a $12,000-a-day penalty for missing DIA’s original October 29, 1993 completion date, as well as assuming the costs of building the $50 million conventional tug-and-cart baggage system, summed up the situation thus: We have gotten to the point with the city that literally we are not talking to each other. Consultants recommended a backup baggage system, and the minute that the decision was made, the city had to defend it. We are left out in limbo. 14 Purchased by Ashley Matcheck ([emailprotected] com) on April 11, 2012 396-311 -15- Exhibit 1 Organization Chart Acting Associate Director of Aviation Denver International Airport City Attorneys Contract Compliance DIA Coordinator Tenant Facilities Administrative Assistant Marketing/Public Information Manager Planner Program Manager Computer Systems Administration Deputy Program Manager Airline Specialty Systems Environmental Engineer Contracts Risk Management Financial Manager of Design Contract Administration Administrative Assistant Manager of Project Controls Architectural Supervisor Engineering Supervisor Document Control Contracts Staff Clerical Staff MIS Schedule Cost Estimating Project Managers Support Staff Manager of Construction Project Controls Support Staff Safety Manager Senior Project Engineer QA/QC Manager Employee Relations Area 12 Manager Area 3 Manager Area 4A Manager Area 4B Manager Area 5 Manager Construction Support Staff Source: City and County of Denver, Colorado, Airport System Review Bonds, Series 1991D, October 1991. Purchased by Ashley Matcheck ([emailprotected] com) on April 11, 2012

Coaching Philosophy Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 250 words - 1

Coaching Philosophy - Essay Example At all times, the coach will use statements that indicate confidence in players, practice fair treatment to all, and discuss no player with other or scolded them public. The coach trusts in the promoting and improving team member’s personal growth as the principal reason of athletics, especially the development of emotional, physical, social, rational, and moral capabilities. The coach will therefore, adhere to team’s core values during team practice, games, and events, as they are crucial for the success of and assisting athletes to become respectable role models. The values observed include family, respect, toughness, commitment, work ethic, passion, integrity, competitive, and toughness. Through these values, our team has cement needed to support the team’s path for 2014-2015 The coach trains the complete player by getting them to their maximum and filling them with positive stimulus, through passion to develop character, player, and team unity. Through these principles, players will play smart, have fun, remain composed, and not have fear of failure (Cassidy, Jones and Potrac

A Study of Chromosome formation through observation of the cell cycle Research Paper

A Study of Chromosome formation through observation of the cell cycle (Abstract) - Research Paper Example We grew union roots to two centimeters, retrieved a 1cm sample, allowed them to steep in a fixative solution for 24 hours which keeps them in stasis, exposed them to hydochloric acid at sixty degrees Celsius, prepared the onion onto a slide, applied the reagent, sealed the slide and observed using an optical microscope. We did a similar process to a kanoi, in order to understand differences and similarities in chromosomal formation. Chromosomal bunching was observed, and it became difficult to distinguish between chromosomes. Most observations were of the interphase period. Chromosomes split, reproduced on DNA molecules during the S stage, became thicker and shorter and produced spindle fiber. Only a tiny minority of cells observed were in metaphase, moving to the equatorial plane; however, this tiny minority was more than expected, as metaphase is by far the most brief phase and it is likely in any given sample that no cells would be in metaphase at the time of the application of th e fixative. Anaphase and telophase samples were also observed. 7% more interphase cells were perceived than would be expected by random chance, well within standard error. P value was .734, larger than expected but still not sufficient to reject the null hypothesis.

The Effect of Sildenafil on mouse oocyte development in vivo followed Literature review

The Effect of Sildenafil on mouse oocyte development in vivo followed by in vitro culture until the blastocyst stage - Literature review Example ersity, Belfast, Glenn took samples of sperm from volunteers and bathed them in weak solutions of sildenafil citrate, to produce a dosage, equal to that found in the blood of a male who had consumed a tablet of the drug. The behaviour of the treated sperm was compared with another sample of untreated sperm. The findings indicate that sildenafil citrate increased the activity level of the sperms, but found that it damaged the acrosome of the sperm, which contains enzymes needed to dissolve the membrane of a womans oocyte. This meant that the acrosome breaks down early, and thus, it is not able to act on the womans eggs, and fertilisation does not take place (McKie, 2008). Sildenafil has been used with great success for the treatment of erectile problems in males since 1997 (Sher et al. 2000). The fact that NO synthase is present in the ovarian cells, the endometrium (Hattori and Tabata, 2006) and within the ovarian vascular network (Sher, et al. 2000) combined with the finding that its vasodilatory effects show a positive correlation to its concentration, oriented the researchers (Tamanini, et al., 2002) to use sildenafil as a treatment for hypertension and Intrauterine Growth Restriction (IUGR) during pregnancy (Sasser and Baylis, 2010). A research by Neithardt et al. (2005) studied the process of embryo after loading, by placing the catheter and a dose of sildenafil citrate, applied vaginally for 127 women who had difficulty in conceiving. After some time, the researchers found that the pregnancy rate of women with ET, was 52.4%, and at the same time, it was 34.9% for the group who were not administered the dose. The researchers therefore concluded that sildenafil citrate impacts the success of embryo transplant after loading. In a related research, Zinger et al. (2006) used sildenafil citrate to treat two infertile women, who suffered from the Ashermans syndrome. The women had a thin endometrium, and had subsequently failed to conceive in previous IVF

Managing IT outsourcing Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2250 words

Managing IT outsourcing - Essay Example The following is an overview of managing the IT outsourcing relationship, which includes the business process of outsourcing, the tools and resources, understanding the cost and return on investment. Furthermore, there will be some examples of risk management and data security, as well as a look at the dimensions of relationship management and its importance.Business Process Outsourcing is best explained by Medas Company, an outsourcing management consultant. Their document, A Practical Guide to Business Process Outsourcing (2006) gives straightforward information on the actual process of Managing IT Outsourcing. The following matrix (Medas 2006) shows the services and steps in functional IT management outsourcing:Medas (2006) states that first, it is important for the manager to identify the organisation's needs as the scope of activities, the reasons for outsourcing, and how this will impact or change the business model. This includes understanding the current organisational struct ure, the IT system infrastructure including the team members functional roles and the systems that support them. Medas notes that the current volume of transactions being internally processes must be examined. Once the current functionality and organisation's objectives for outsourcing have been established, Medas states that the next step is to choose an outsourcing partner:"the Outsourcing partner's people need to fully understand the organisation's needs. ... They need to understand the systems that support the back office processes as well as having experience in managing complex systems environments, running and supporting hardware and developing systems, including web enabling. At this stage, it is also important to consider whether the Outsourcing partner can ensure network connectivity in a secure environment that permits data integration" (Medas pp 10 2006). The next step in the process of managing IT outsourcing is to agree on a commercial framework. This allows the involved parties to agree on the provisions of service, and should compromise "Details such as fixed costs, unit pricing and the level of investment could all be defined in the commercial framework" (Medas p 11 2006). Lastly, the IT manager wants to develop a transitional plan that establishes the business process and features. This includes: A review of the current systems, processes and organisational structure -identifying which systems are to be transferred (Medas p 11 2006). Definition of services to be provided (Medas p 11 2006). Agree the definition of service levels in terms of Service Level Measures (SLM) and Service Level Agreements (SLA) (Medas p 11 2006). How employees will be affected by the transition e.g. how many staff and what types of jobs will be transferred, where they will be located, how they will be dealt with in terms of motivation and ongoing training and development (Medas p 11 2006). How the process of staff transferral will be managed (TUPE) and what changes, if any, are to be made to the retained organisation - and how this will be communicated to all those involved (Medas p 11 2006). The stages of the transition - and the timeframe involved (Medas p 11 2006). Agree and finalise the contractual terms of the arrangement

Locke and Descartes source of knowledge Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

Locke and Descartes source of knowledge - Essay Example For this reason, the theory holds that metaphysics, ethics, and math principles are fundamentally true and that physical evidence and proof are not needed to ascertain knowledge. Due to this belief, the rationalism theory is in direct opposition to empiricism. Empiricism, of which Locke is an integral proponent, contends that knowledge can only be obtained via the experience of sense. It emphasizes that evidence and experience, particularly the experience of sense, plays a more fundamental role in idea formation than traditions and innate ideas (Scheibe & Falkenburg 2011). The theory also contends that these traditions also arise due to prior experience through the senses. The theory emphasizes evidence, contending that all theories and hypotheses need to be tested against natural world observations and not simply relying on intuition or reasoning. The empirical theory is a better theory in discussing the source of knowledge because all that man knows has its basis on experience, whi le innate knowledge can be corrected with time following observation. Comparison Locke’s notion in the empiricism theory of an idea was borrowed from, the discussions by Descartes. According to Locke, the mind is the immediate object of understanding, thought, or perception by the mind (Scheibe & Falkenburg 2011). This is similar to what Descartes considers an idea to be, contending that it is what the mind can perceive immediately. Locke also discusses external object qualities, differentiating between secondary and primary qualities. Secondary qualities are explained as those, which are absent in the objects, instead being sensed, or perceived, while primary qualities cannot be separated at any time from the object. This is also similar to Descartes’ distinction using the candle. According to him, one can perceive the duration, substance, and shape of the candle but cannot clearly perceive sound and color, corresponding to primary and secondary qualities by Locke res pectively (Scheibe & Falkenburg 2011). Both Locke and Descartes contend that man is different from other animals and machines. According to Descartes, this is because machines are unable to use signals or words to declare what they know to other machines (Scheibe & Falkenburg 2011). In addition, animals do not have any reasoning in interpreting knowledge. Locke, similarly, claims that animals cannot abstract or come up with general ideas because they cannot utilize words. In their arguments, it is clear to see that they believe animals have no use for knowledge or ideas. Locke and Descartes also discuss the role of free will in gaining knowledge, considering that man’s will can remain free and be directed, as well as the fact that free will in gathering knowledge, being both free and directed, is consistent with man’s ability to err in his ways (Scheibe & Falkenburg 2011). Descartes contends that when a person is inclined to lean to one side, he possesses more free wil l. In addition, he also argues that free will is greater than intellect and knowledge. Locke builds on these arguments by contending that the determination of man by his free will does not restrain his liberty, while also arguing that bad judgments from available knowledge leads to bad choices. Contrast Descartes believes that knowledge

Business Strategy Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 3000 words - 2

Business Strategy - Essay Example Best cost strategy combines strategic emphasis on low cost as well as focused differentiation. It focuses on giving its customers more value for money. For E.g. Kingfisher Red Airlines is an example of best cost airlines providing luxury of Kingfisher Airlines but at comparatively lower price than that of competitors in luxury segment. The product line of company employing best cost strategy has products with appealing attributes and assorted upscale features. The aim of focused differentiation strategy is to secure a competitive advantage through offering customers of niche market with a product that they perceive as vary well suited to their needs, tastes and preferences. The strategic target of focused differentiation strategy is a narrow market in which needs and preferences of the buyers are distinctively different. Attributes appealing specifically towards niche members forms the basis of competitive advantage in focused differentiation strategy. B. Explain in detail, IKEA†™s hybrid strategy? IKEA used a mix of low cost and differentiation strategies as a part of its hybrid strategy. They used innovative means for attracting customers and people who can become there prospective customers in near future. The company tried to create differentiation in the retailing industry it operated in. It could be taken instance from the fact that the company allowed its customers to relax in its western style stores in a view that they could be aspiring customers of IKEA in near future. The production emphasis of products in focused differentiation strategy depends on customization meeting the tastes and requirements of targeted customers. The marketing emphasis of this strategy is towards communicating that how the product offers all the requirements in meeting buyers’ expectation in target market. Commitment in serving to niche markets better than rivals remains the key of sustaining the strategy. C. Why is IKEA’s hybrid strategy is difficult for competitors to imitate? Hybrid strategy is difficult for imitate and lend IKEA to outsmart competition. This is because through hybrid strategy IKEA is created a mix of two competitive strategies i.e. low cost and differentiation and the mix of these two strategies becomes difficult to imitate. D. Explain 3 business risks that IKEA faces in its hybrid strategy? The three business risks related to hybrid strategy are: These strategies could lack flexibility for IKEA in the scenario of changing external environment. These strategies could lack specificity in a long run for IKEA. Hybrid strategies help a company majorly when the organization has resources and capabilities of employing the strategy and serving an attractive niche market. Question 2 Provide the explanation with two examples in each of the 5 macro environmental influences that IKEA face from operating internationally? Macro-Economic Forces This includes forces at national and regional level that affects the company. IKEA is retail chain build on a global platform where factors like inflation rates, interest rate and current exchange rates in bear some impact, but such impact can’t be considered influential. As the interest rates are slashed as a result of recession in the economy, the company could borrow money at a cheaper interest rate. Same is the case with changes in current

Golden Gate Bridge History Essay Example for Free

Golden Gate Bridge History Essay The First proposal for the Golden Gate Bridge came from James Wilkins, who at the time was an engineering student. The cost of James Wilkins Bridge was unrealistic at the time which was 100million dollars, but none the less it set the bar for other bridge engineers to try to work out a cheaper solution. During this time a young Joseph Strauss had graduated from the University of Cincinnati with a degree in Business and Economics. Joseph was an avid student at his school and was the class president and poet for his class. Joseph’s interests with engineering and bridge design some might say happened by chance, in that, one day Joseph once tried out for his school’s football team but got injured and taken to the infirmary. During his stay, he gazed outside the window at the Cincinnati-Covington Bridge. Little did anyone know, Joseph was on his way to becoming a leader in his society and a hero amongst most. Joseph spent some time working at an office for an engineering firm which designed bridges, and after a preposition to his firm was rejected, he though to start his own firm and take his idea with him. Joseph went on to create the Strauss Bascule bridge company of Chicago where he amped up the modern day bascule bridge (draw bridge) with his designs and ideas. At the Strauss Bascule bridge company of Chicago, Josephs worked on the Burnside Bridge in Portland in the year 1926, the Lewis and Clark Bridge in 1930, the Cherry street Strauss and Trunnion Bridge, the Washington Street Bridge, the Hoquiam Bridge, the Skansen Bridge and finally worked as the chief engineer on the golden Gate Bridge. All of this was done without a proper degree in engineering. Joseph first tackled the idea of designing the Golden Gate Bridge with a plan of having two double cantilever spans linked by a central suspension segment. This design was rejected and later on a fellow engineer working on the project under Joseph by the name of Leon Moisseiff came up with the Final Design for the Golden Gate Bridge. Joseph was a very conservative man and left plenty of room for error throughout the entire process of designing and building the Golden Gate Bridge. Joseph insisted that a net be placed under the work space to catch workers who accidentally fell off. This net tha t he implemented saved a total of 19 lives and he was commemorated more than ever for it. Joseph received a statue at the end of the Golden Gate Bridge on the San Francisco side. Leon Moisseiff received the Franklin Institute’s Louis E Levy Medal in 1933 and was a leading suspension bridge designer within America. Leon graduated from Colombia University with a degree in civil engineering in 1895. Leon had a number of bridges which he has worked with but to name a few of most notable were the Manhattan Bridge and the Benjamin Franklin Bridge in Delaware. Leon Moisseif was best known for his work with the deflection theory which simply stated that the longer a bridge spans the more room it has to wiggle and move. He applied this principle on the Golden Gate Bridge as it was to span a length no bridge has spanned before at the time. Moisseiff was mainly in charge of the calculation of force revolving the wind the Bridge would have to withstand and one of his co-workers, Charles Ellis was a big believer in Moisseiff and his â€Å"Deflection Theory†. Charles Ellis was first appointed onto the Golden Gate Bridge project by Strauss himself. Strauss recognized him as a well renowned scholar of mathematics but as ironic as it is, Ellis like Joseph Strauss never received a degree in Engineer either, but one thing Ellis had on Joseph was a certificate in the field. Charles had fallen in love with the engineering and went on to write a book named â€Å"essentials of theory in framed structure† which became a mandatory text for Harvard and Yale engineer students. Charles graduated from the University of Wesleyan with a degree in Greek and Mathematics. Charles worked as a professor of engineering at the University of Michigan and the University of Illinois for some time. Ellis was a key part in the construction and design of the Golden Gate Bridge but Joseph made an alarming move which was controversial. Joseph accused Ellis of wasting time and money on the project and ordered Charles Ellis to take a vacation from work, and near the end of it Ellis received a letter from Joseph telling him not to come back to the job. Ellis was devastated and was still much attached to the project. After he had been released he began teaching at the University of Perdue and on top of his teachings kept working at problems and overlooking the designs for the Golden Gate Bridge dedicating around 70 hours a week. He found several errors which raised some eyes brows and in no time sent a letter to Moissieff. Charles Ellis was given almost no credit for his 3 years dedicated to working on the Golden Gate Bridge. His name was not mentioned on the list of builders but until recently was given a plaque acknowledging his participation in the bridge design. How the Golden Gate Bridge affected the local community. The Golden Gate Bridge is a historic achievement of great magnitude in the San Francisco and California region. It has created many jobs for the locals as positions were promised to be favouring them and also had brought attention to the area from all around the world. A total of 10 construction companies were called into the building of the bridge and materials from all over the world were brought in and in tremendous amounts, 83 000 tons of steel and 389 000 cubic yards of concrete. Conclusion The Golden Gate Bridge is a Remarkable piece of engineering. It has come a long way over its 4-5 years of construction and not to mention all that was needed to set its plan in motion. It has faced many obstacles to get to where it is at today, being one of Americas most recognizable attractions. The Golden Gate Bridge pushed the limits of its time, being the longest, highest bridge of its time really opened the eyes of many people in what exactly careful engineering can accomplish. It has had lots of passionate dedicated workers behind it since day one and along the road had its ups and down but in the end turned out to be one of mankind’s greatest accomplishments.

History of the Atom Discovery

History of the Atom Discovery Mohammad Shahraan Khan  Phys Helen O’Keefe The secrets of atom Democritus was the first one to suggest that objects are made from something called atoms. Although Democritus was an ancient Greek philosopher, the word ‘atoms’ is from the Greek word atoma which means individual. Democritus was around from 460 – 370 BC and he further deduced that atoms are solid spheres and that they can’t be split anymore. Next, Aristotle who was also an ancient Greek philosopher, offered that items or objects were made from ‘Elements’. He said that the elements are either earth, wind, fire, and water and the properties to go with it for example dry, cold, hot, wet. Something could be made by joining elements together and could be converted into other things by adding other elements. Aristotle’s atomic theory was to show that anything made with fire could be either hot or dry or if anything was made with earth, this could be either dry or cold. At that time arguments were established by thought, reason and debate, there were no experiments as experiments were thought to be vulgar. Now as Aristotle was a wealthy man and was treated as a celebrity, his explanations were based on familiar experiences, he made conclusions based on what he saw for example snow and fire joined together makes water. Whereas Democritus was not as popular and nobody wanted to believe him as his theory was saying that atoms couldn’t be seen. Basically Aristotle’s theory was the basis of atoms all the way to the middle ages. In addition, Robert Boyle who was around from 1627 – 1691, studied gases and conferred the likelihood of atoms existing. He predicted that elements are made from something called ‘corpuscles’. He stated that atoms are organised in groups and that different groups are different chemical substances. It was around his time that experiments has started to come around. Moreover, Isaac Newton was another scientist who was around 1643 – 1727, he also studied gases. He is famous for being the one who discovered gravity. He proposed a mechanical universe where solid masses were in movement. Also that atoms/particles are not stationary. Furthermore, Antoine Lavoisier who was around 1627 – 1691 became known as the father of modern chemistry. He was an excellent experimentalist, and as such he assembled an accurate and precise balance to investigate oxidation. He demonstrated that when a substance is oxidised, the increase in its mass is equal to the mass lost by the surrounding air. He stated one of the most fundamental laws of science which is the mass conservation law and it states that matter cannot be created nor destroyed. Additionally, John Dalton was around from 1766 – 1844 and he suggested a theory of atoms, which are that elements consists of tiny particles called atoms. Atoms of the same element are alike whereas atoms of different elements vary in size, mass and other properties. Atoms cannot be divided, created or destroyed. Compounds (molecules) are made when different elements are joined together in whole-number ratios. In a chemical reaction, atoms are linked, separated or rearranged. Likewise, during the 19th Century, people were eager to find new elements and by 1860, 60 new elements had been discovered. Then a scientist called Dimitri Mendeleev who was around in the time of 1834 – 1907, had a concept of classifying the elements. He rearranged the elements in order of ascending atomic weight, he discovered consistent patterns and he invented a table to predict presence of numerous elements. The modern version of the periodic table organises elements according to an ‘atomic number’. An atomic number is number of protons added with number of neutrons. Changes that are given to the modern periodic table are the positions of some elements. Also then in 1857, Heinrich Geissler experiments on whether electricity can still travel, if the air was taken away. So when most of the air was sucked out, the tube still glowed. This attributed the small amount of air left in the tube. He discovered different gases generated different colours of light. People liked this a lot and so used them for entertainment for example neon lights. Energy saving lightbulbs are an example of gas discharge tubes. Then another scientist named Crookes who made a vacuum tube and he made a better vacuum tube than Heinrich Geissler as it sucks more air out. As a result there is no glow in the tube but on the glass at the end of the tub glowed green. There a cross was produced a shadow on the screen. For the vacuum tube, whatever moved the current, travels in a straight line. Crookes designed a lightweight wheel to see if the rays made it turn. The experiment method was to apply a voltage to the apparatus, the wheel moved away from the cathode but the light wouldn’t turn this wheel. Cathode rays must be some kind of small particle. J.J. Thomson who was around 1856 – 1940 wanted to see if the particles could be strayed by a magnet and also if another voltage was applied to the tube. He designed an even better vacuum than Crookes’ and Heinrich Geissler’s vacuum tubes. He observed that the rays bounced towards the positive plate. Particles are negatively charged. He hypothesised that these particles are part of the atom. â€Å"†¦ the atoms of the elements consist of a number of negatively electrified corpuscles enclosed in a sphere of uniform positive electrification, †¦Ã¢â‚¬  1^ and 1* [Thomson, 1904] This was compared to a British dessert at the time so it became known as the plum pudding model. Ernest Rutherford was around from 1871-1937, was accountable for discoveries in radioactivity and nuclear physics. He was a student of J.J. Thomson and wanted to determine the size of the atom. He fired positively charged particle at a thin gold foil. He anticipated positively charged particles would not deviate as they passed through the positive sphere. Rutherford actually observed that about 2 in every 7 positive particles deflected back. â€Å"It was quite the most incredible event that has ever happened to me in my life. It was almost as incredible as if you fired a 15-inch shell at a piece of tissue paper and it came back and hit you.† Ernest Rutherford. 2^ and 2* [Rutherford, 1964] He discovered alpha and beta rays that pioneered the laws of radioactive decay, and acknowledged alpha particles as helium nuclei. This showed that there is something in the centre of the atom and it contains most of the atomic mass. Rutherford clarified his results by saying that atoms is ma de up of mainly empty space, they are small, dense and that there is a positive sphere at the centre known as the nucleus. The positively charged particles are redirected if they are close enough to the nucleus and also that electrons orbit the nucleus. There is a theory known as the electromagnetic theory which states that any charged particle in a circular orbit radiates electromagnetic energy. The electron loses energy as it orbits the nucleus. The radius of its orbit decreases as the energy decreases. The electron should spiral towards the nucleus. The electron should emit electromagnetic waves as it loses energy at a mixture of frequencies over a certain range. The radiation spectra were not continuous. The emission spectra couldn’t be resolved with the Rutherford model, no one really understood why the formula worked. Although a scientist named J.J. Balmer has studied the emission spectrum for several elements. Spectra for other elements could be predicted using the formula. A mathematical model could be made on observations from hydrogen. Neils Bohr who was around at the time of 1885 – 1962 came with a revolutionary proposal which states energy of an orbiting atom is quantized i.e. only particular types of energies are allowed. Energies must be multiple of a base unit, he also proposed that the electrons could jump between orbits. He was the one that pioneered the quantum theory. The Bohr model shows that electrons orbit in shells of definite energy. If an electron changes from a higher to a lower energy state, the change in energy is proportional to the frequency f of the emitted photon. The energy is given off as a photon of definite energy. This relates line spectra to atomic model. Energy is only released when electrons moves to a lower energy state. Photon represents the â€Å"spare energy†. Planck proposed light travels in discrete packets of energy which is quanta. Quanta is photons. Photons move at the speed of light and they have an associated frequency. For the electron to emit light, minimum energy is required. Quantum theory explains the photoelectric effect. Einstein’s equation E = mc2 relates matter and energy. In conclusion the atomic structure and the atom itself is so interesting to learn about and you could spend millenniums studying about it. It built the way to radioactivity, x ray treatment, matter and anti-matter particles even dark matter just with atoms. This pioneered nanotechnology and most of the stuff we see today. The theory of relativity could be related to this in a way because atoms were the cause of all these theories we see today. Richard Feynman who became one of the best-known scientists in the world remarks about the atom in this statement â€Å"If all of scientific knowledge were to be destroyed, and only one sentence passed on to the next generations of creatures, what statement would contain the most information in the fewest words? I believe it is the atomic hypothesis that all things are made of atoms – little particles that move around in perpetual motion, attracting each other when they are a little distance apart, but repelling upon being squeezed into one another. In that one sentence, you will see, there is an enormous amount of information about the world, if just a little imagination and thinking are applied†¦Ã¢â‚¬  3* and 3^ [Feynman, 1998] this quote demonstrates that how atoms are so interesting and so interesting that even in millennia people will be studying it. Bibliography 1* Thomson, J.J. (1904). On the Structure of the Atom: an Investigation of the Stability and Periods of Oscillation of a number of Corpuscles arranged at equal intervals around the Circumference of a Circle; with Application of the Results to the Theory of Atomic Structure (extract of paper). Philosophical Magazine, p.237 (British science journal) 2* Rutherford, E. (1964). Rutherford and the Nature of the Atom by E. N. da C. Andrade, p.111, and quoted in Nobel Laureates in chemistry (1901-1992) by Laylin K. James, p.57. 3* Feynman, R. (1998). Six Easy Pieces: Fundamentals of Physics Explained (Penguin Press Science, Paperback), p.4 References 1^ Plum Pudding Model. (n.d.). In Wikipedia. Retrieved 12th February 2015, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plum_pudding_model 2^ Ernest Rutherford. (n.d.). In Wikiquote. Retrieved 12th February 2015, from http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Ernest_Rutherford 3^ Richard Feynman. (n.d.). In The Information Philosopher. Retrieved 12th February 2015, from http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/feynman/ Word Count 1811